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In North Carolina today a large but unknown number of persons
believe that they have legally adopted children, and are completely
mistaken in that belief. To most of them it would be a deep shock to dis-
cover that *their intentions have been thwarted, and that under the deci-
sions of the highest court of this state they are not adoptive parents at
all, but mere custodians of the children they are nurturing and rearing
as their own. In view of the fact that our decisions not only make
void many existing adoptions, but are likely to discourage others, and
in view of the fact that our court still takes its stand with a dwindling
group which clings to a strict and harsh view of adoption law, it may
be well first to examine the legal and social device of adoption, to see
what it is and what usefulness it serves in modern society, and then in
this light and in the light of recent decisions in other states1 to scrutinize
our own holdings to see if they are valid or valuable.
Adoption has been defined or described from various points of view.
A good working definition is that adoption is a process whereby the
relation of parent and child is created between persons who had no such
legal relation by birth.2 It effects a substitution of parents.,3 It not
only creates a new parent child relation, it terminates an old one.4 A
new status is created and the adopted person becomes in laiv a different
person.5 One court speaks of a child by adoption as being "born such
by the will of the adoptive parent:"6  Sociologists have called adoption
"a social type of birth". 7 However, these statements are not declara-
tions of truth prevailing absolutely and prevailing everywhere. The new
status of parent and child is by no means complete for all legal purposes
in all jurisdictions; how legally complete it is varies from one American
jurisdiction to another. Jurisdictions also vary as to how completely the
old natural tie is severed. A good deal of misapprehension exists as to
the absolute character of adoption. Thus the authors of an uncommonly
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
'Cases from other jurisdictions used in this article almost all date from 1926
to the present. The great number of decisions in this field was one factor in
confining study to the more recent cases; further, in view of a change in the
attitude of many courts some of the older cases are of little worth.
'Cf. Adoption in THt ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (14th ed. 1936) 177.
'4 VERNIER, AmERICAN FAmILy LAWS (1936) 405.
' In 31 American jurisdictions the statutes seem sufficient to sever completely
the legal relationship between natural parent and child. Id. at 406.
Hutton, Concerning Adoption and Adopted Persons as Heirs in Pennsylvania
(1937) 42 DIcK. L. R6v. 12, 13.8 Shaver v. Nash, 181 Ark. 1112, 1116, 29 S. W. (2d) 298, 300 (1930).
BRooxs AND BROOKS, ADVENTURING iN ADoPToN, (1939) 6.
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excellent treatise on adoption from the human and sociological points
of view are led to write, ". . . the adopted child's position in the family
is rightly as irrevocable as though he had been decreed through biolog-
ical birth for that particular family." The authors here pay the law
an unearned compliment; what they describe as rightly existing is right
but not existing. As we shall see, the law does not universally measure
up to any such statement.
The device of adoption is so old that its origins are lost in the dim-
ness of prehistoric times. Indeed it is said that adoption is about as old
as the family itself.9 Among very ancient civilizations we find it al-
ready existing when those civilizations become first visible in the light
of history. References are made to adoption in the code of Hammurabi,
2285 B.C. It was known also to the Assyrians, Egyptians, Greeks, and
Romans. 10 We are reminded by one writer that Moses was the adopted
son of Pharaoh's daughter." Adoption was practiced among many
continental nations from remotest antiquity.:' It was found among the
American Indians,"3 and the Polynesians.' 4 Indeed one of the greatest
of historical jurists, after pointing out that both the making of wills and
adoptions are contrivances for preventing descent from being inter-
rupted when there is no succession of kindred, adds that of the two
expedients adoption is the only one which suggested itself to the greater
part of archaic societies.1 5
Under Roman law adoption was by a solemn public ceremony, re-
quiring the presence of all the parties, the adopted, the adoptor, and the
natural parents, and also requiring the sanction of the curiae. The
adopted person entered into the family of the adoptor. The law of
Justinian dispensed with the ceremony, and provided for adoption by
deed in the presence of a magistrate. Again all three parties had to be
present and give consent.' 6 In the course of its long history adoption
has been accomplished in many ways: by ceremony, deed, contract,
special acts of legislative bodies, and by judicial process.
17
On the other hand, adoption was unknown to the Scotch or English
law. The peculiarities of feudal tenure have been suggested as a pos-
sible explanation."8 At any rate it is almost universally conceded that
under the common law adoption did not exist.1 9
8 Ibid. " Id. at 80.
"0Brosnan, The Law of Adoption (1922) 22 CoL. L. REv. 332.
112 Id. at 333. "Hutton, loc. cit. supra note 5.
"'Hutton, loc. cit. supra note 5, quotes a graphic. account by Col. James Smith
of his adoption into the Delaware Tribe in 1775.
" LowiE, Adoption. Primitive in ExCCCLOPAEDIA OF THE SocIAL SCIENCES
(1930) 459.
MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (3d Amer. ed. 1873) 188.
18Limbaugh, The Adoption of Children in Missouri (1937) 2 Mo. L. REv.
300, 302. 1 Ibid.
"- Brosnan, supra note 10, at 335; Note (1934) 2 Duxa B. A. J. 17, 18.
" Wells v. Zenz, 83 Cal. App. 137, 256 Pac. 484 (1927) ; PEcx, THE LAW oF
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Whatever the reasons were for the non-appearance of adoption in
the common law, those reasons are dead. No change of legal policy
could be more complete than that which has brought adoption into our
law. Every single American jurisdiction has provided for adoption by
statute.20 England, whence we imported the common law, likewise has
its adoption statute.21 Adoption is legally provided for in almost all
civilized nations. 2 - Such a universal acceptance of a policy cannot be
ascribed to any unstable popular fancy or transient legislative whim.
The unanimous action of all forty-eight states of the union in passing
adoption statutes presents a reform springing out of a profound change
in the point of view of the people, founded on deep, fundamental prog-
ress, comparable to the enlightenment which led to the sweeping changes
embodied in married women's statutes. Here is law springing indeed
from the life of the people. In Great Britain the practice of receiving
children into homes and bringing them up as the new parents' own
children was not uncommon even before, the passage of an adoption
statute, and the children were called adopted children.23 In America
the demand for children for adoption is outstripping the ability of child
placing agencies to supply it. The demand comes from diverse classes
and conditions of people.24 Not all adoptions in this country are re-
ported, but in 1933 the number of reported adoptions was 5,833.25
The ancient device of adoption has been taken up by modern society
and turned into one of its most effective instruments for removing social
ills and injustices. It is hard for those who live today in a comparatively
enlightened society to realize how inhumane and barbarous that society
was even within the life span of persons still living. Even that recently
in America unprotected children were treated with callous cruelty.
We read incredulously that turing the period preceding 1867 eighty
out of every hundred children in the state almshouses of Massachusetts
died during their first year in such places.26 Unfortunate children were
put in institutions, where their misery would not be as embarrassing as it
might be if left visible to the public gaze. We read that children were
PERSONS AND DomEsTic RELATIONS (id ed. 1930) 352; Note (1936) 11 IND. L. J.
484. But there is some evidence that adoption did exist at common law in this
country, for Hutton, supra note 5, at 17 calls attention to a Pennsylvania statute
which provided that "'When the common law form of adopting a child by deed
has been practiced"' the deed may be recorded, etc. Adoption existed in England
on a de facto basis before the English adoption statute was passed. BROOKS AND
BRooKs, ADVENTURING IN ADOPTION (1939) 101.20 4 VERNIE, AmERICAN FAmY LAws (1936) 279.
2116 & 17 Gro. V., c. 29 (1926).2 BROOKS AND BROOKS, ADVENTURING IN ADO TION (1939) 112; ABBOTT, Adop-
tion, Modern in ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1930) 460; Brosnan,
supra note 10, at 334. "8 Abbott, supra note 22, at 462.
24 BAYLOR AND MONACHESI, THE REHABILITATION OF CHILDREN (1939) 31.5 BROOKS AN BROOKS, ADVENTURING IN ADOPTION (1939).
"' BAYLOR AND MONACHEsI, THE REHABILITATION OF CHILDREN (1939) 2, 3.
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"herded together in orphanages where little or no medical attention was
given to them, or were shipped by carloads from state to state to be
placed in free homes where their fate was left to chance." 27 One of
the most valuable devices perfected for use in transforming this brutal
picture has been the device of adoption. In the face of many a large
scale social ill individuals look on with a feeling of helplessness, believing
that the problem is beyond the power of any person to cope with it. But
in adoption we have a simple device whereby ordinary persons can really
do something effective about the matter of unfortunate children. Of
course, present day institutions for the care of children are by no means
the terrifying places they were years ago. But for most normal children
an institution at its best is not to be compared with a home at its best.
Beyond much question the technique of adoptions has been so far per-
fected that great numbers of children are being successfully transplanted
into new homes where they grow into the family life as fully as if they
had been born there. By such a transplanting the child obtains much
which could be given him in no other way; he finds the deep security
which comes from knowing that by those nearest him he is supremely
desired; that he holds a first place in their affections, and that no one
can iake away that place; in short, that he belongs. "At home we need
the warmth of understanding, the assurance of steady devotion, the
stimulation of undemanding affection, that a well-knit family circle can
supply. The evidence is strong that the adoptive home does not lag
behind the natural one in the production of these qualities."' 28 As a
result of studies made of considerable numbers of adoptions, it was ob-
served that the loyalty and devotion of adoptive families seemed to equal
if not exceed these qualities in the natural families studied for com-
parative purposes. 29 Studies of the effect on children of being trans-
planted into good homes and good environments by adoption have turned
up some extraordinary results. One study shows a larger proportion of
foster children making good in school than was true of the general pop-
ulation. The intelligence scores of foster children were found to be ten
to fifteen points higher than would have been expected of children com-
ing from their initial inferior background. Also, a gain was shown as
compared with tests before adoption took place. Another study like-
wise indicates that adoption, by producing a better environment, pro-
duces a better opportunity for the growth of intelligence.30 This was
to be expected; a strong brain like a strong body may be in part the
result of diligent training in a proper environment, as well as heredity.
There are a number of reasons making for success in the new homes.
2 7 Id. at 3.
2' BROOKS AND BROOKS, ADVENTURING I N ADOPTION (1939) 9.
9Id. at 174. "Id. at 175-177.
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Usually parents will not adopt children unless they very deeply desire
them. Normally people are not likely to adopt children until they are
able to care for them. Adoptive parents are commonly more mature
than natural parents; they average ten or more years older.3 ' A study
of adoptive parents in Minnesota shows that most of the parents were
childless couples married nearly ten years. "The proportion of adoptive
fathers in professional, business, and managerial occupations greatly
exceeded that of adult men in general." 32 Thus it is indicated that adop-
tions are favored by a class of persons likely to be responsible.
The superiority of a good foster home over an institution however
good has been considered; but with many children the alternative lies
between a foster home or the home to which the child was born. In this
connection it must be kept in mind that a large percentage of adopted
children were born illegitimate.33 The figure has been set as high as
sixty per cent.34 It is not necessary to describe in detail the shadow
which from ancient times society has cast over innocent children who,
through no fault of theirs, are born out of wedlock; a shadow which
follows them through life, and which to many has proved an oppressive
mental handicap. By adoption this dark background can be transformed.
The adopted child can, where the law is adequate, be lifted out of this
old background, and all connection with it can be severed. Further, by
adoption the child, in his new environment, is given the legal status of
a legitimate natural child of his adoptive parents.3 5 In this particular,
as in so many others, adoption strikingly parallels marriage; each by
solemn procedure creates a family relationship where none existed before,
each brings into the lives of those concerned an accompanying point of
view, set of beliefs, and pattern of conduct accepted the world over and
rooted deep in ancient tradition, each from time to time has been accom-
plished through forms noticeably similar, and each by the solemn pro-
cedure plus the attending intentions and beliefs has the effect of making
legitimate children who would otherwise be differently regarded.
Even in the case of legitimate children adoption may be the means
of rescuing them from environments which would blight them. Good
parents usually keep their children. If the child is available for adoption
it usually means that some major disaster -has made it impossible for
the parents to care for the child, or that the parents are people unfit, to
care for the child. In the one case the child may be rescued from dire
want and a hopeless future, in the other from an unsavory and corrupt-
3" Id. at 31. 32 Id. at 178, 179.
" Studies made some time ago showed thatin Philadelphia County 35% of the
adopted children had been illegitimate; in certain Massachusetts counties 61%, in
Minnesota 44%. Abbott, supra note 22, at 462.
"BROOKS AND BROOKS, ADVENTURING IN AnoPTIoN (1939) 20.
"Rogers v. Baldridge, 18 Tenn. App. 300, 76 S. W. (2d) 655, 663 (1934).
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ing environment. In either case adoption may be the best means of
insuring the child a normal childhood and reasonable opportunity. Many
legitimate children become adoptable because their parents abandon
them, or because they are taken from their parents on account of such
unfit home conditions as feeblemindedness, drunkenness, failure to sup-
port adequately, and low morals.5 6 The assumption often made by
courts and others that it is necessarily true that a child's natural parents
are preferable to other parents is a false assumption; the natural parents
may be the most blighting of all influences on the child's life. It all
depends on the parents-and the child.87
Adoption has been emphasized, and rightly so, as an exceedingly
valuable social instrument for child welfare. It is, however, almost
equally important for its work in enriching the lives of the adults who
become adopting parents. Here the principal gain is of a nature which
cannot be measured or totaled, cannot even be described adequately ex-
cept to someone already acquainted with the fullness of life made possible
by children. Suffice it to say that in our era there has been much talk
of the abundant life, and many ambitious economic, political, and social
schemes to attain it; but that multitudes of persons have found that they
attained only the means for a full life without attaining the fullness. Into
the incomplete lives of childless couples adoption has brought satisfac-
tions no socially minded government could have afforded with any num-
ber of borrowed billions. Intimate attachment to and responsibility for
children through all the stages of their growth contribute much to the
maturity of the adult, to his tolerance, his philosophy, his knowledge
of the springs of character.
Nor must it be forgotten that adoptions are a factor promoting also
the welfare of the state.38 They do so by improving the future quality
of the race by furnishing to children better material advantages, better
education, better moral background. Further, the disintegration of fam-
ily life is a symptom of social illness which has alarmed many; families
created because adopting parents were resolute in their desire to build
up a family life have something to offer by way of stability and social
health. 9
All that has been said in praise of adoption could do more harm than
good if said without qualification. Some adoptive parents are not ca-
pable, some are not worthy, and some have the basest motives, varying
BROOKS AND BRooxs, ADVENTURING IN ADOPTION (1939) 22.
' Some of the case studies in BAYLOR AND MONACHESI, THE REHABILITATION
OF CHILDREN (1939) illustrate the baneful effect of the influence of the natural
home in many instances. For example see p. 195, A Good Farm Home. For a
particularly frightful account of what a natural home may mean to a child, in
contrast to a home 'by adoption, see In re Davis' Adoption, 142 Misc. 681, 255
N. Y. Supp. 416 (Surr. Ct., 1932). "Brosnan, supra note 10, at 341.
"Cf. BRooxs AND BROOKS, ADVENTURING IN ADOPTION (1939) 82.
[Vol. 19
THWARTING ADOPTIONS
from a desire to secure unpaid help to outright criminal designs. In the
past courts have at times erred in assuming that adoptions were good
in the same way sugar is sweet-by inherent quality.40 As a result there
has been widespread enactment of provisions requiring much greater
administrative and judicial supervision. Statutes in twenty-four of
fifty-one American jurisdictions now require a thorough investigation
by an administrative agency or officer, or by the court.4 ' North Car-
olina requires that the county superintendent of public welfare or a
representative of a licensed child placing agency investigate to determine
whether the child is a proper subject for adoption, and whether the
foster home is a suitable one for the child, and make a written report
for the use of the court in the adoption proceeding.42 Meanwhile organ-
ized study of child care has gone forward on a worldwide basis, with
individual research workers, private agencies, state and national govern-
ments, and even an international commission active in the field. The
result has been that the placing of children no longer is a field dominated
merely by good intentions, but is the subject of extensive knowledge,
experience, and acquired technique and skill.43 Even in the delicate and
highly personal sphere of adjustment of the child to the new home and
a more acceptable way of living, uncommonly wise discussion and advice
is available.4 4 There is no such thing as certainty that a newly created
relationship between human beings will be successful, but the means are
at hand to insure to a high extent the probability of success when chil-
dren are adopted. Care should be taken to see to it that competent social
workers are obtained to make the required investigations, and to make
sure that the investigations are thorough and not perfunctory. With
proper safeguards present, thought favors adoption as the most satis-
factory type of foster care.45
The discussion thus far has been shaped toward a single question.
Is adoption the sort of legal-social device which should be thwarted, or
should it be encouraged?
TE NORTH CAROLINA LAW
A statute providing for adoptions in this state was enacted in 1873.46
Additions to the statute were made from time to time, and in 1933 it
10 Newbold, Juridictional and Social Aspects of Adoption (1927) 11 MINN. L.
REv. 605. The author mentions some hair-raising cases of abuse of adoption
statutes by too ready judicial consent.
" 4 Vmunza, AMEmcAN FAMILY LAWS (1936) 279.
'2 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §§191(3), 191(5).
"An idea of the scope of the work and the factors to be taken into account
may be gathered from BAYLOR AND MONACHEsI, THE REHABILITATION OF CHIL-
DREN (1939); BROOKS AND BROOKS, ADvENTURING IN ADOPTION (1939). Abbott,
supra note 22, at 462 concludes that the work of children's aid societies in home
finding, investigation before placement, and supervision thereafter has greatly
improved.
"BROOKS AND BROOKS, ADVENTURING IN ADOPTION (1939) -beginning at 55.
15Id. at 112. *N. C. PuB. LAws 1872-1873, c. 155.
19411
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
was repealed and a new adoption act passed.4 7 The 1933 act was in its
turn replaced by a new act in 1935.48 Many provisions of the old statutes,
however, were carried forward into the new. From the beginning the
North Carolina legislation has provided for adoption by court-procedure.
Collateral Attack
An important and very common type of problem which arises under
adoption statutes is presented when an adoption has been had, eventually
an adoptive parent dies, and his heirs contest the validity of the adoption.
Such a situation, with one unusual feature, came before the North Car-
olina court in Truelove v. Parker.49 The unusual feature was that ten
years after the adoption the adoptive parents and the child were all killed
in the same automobile accident, the child surviving the adoptive parents
a short time. The contest was between the heirs of the adoptive parents
and the natural relatives of the child over the property left by the adop-
tive parents.
The outcome of the case emphasizes anew the fact that deciding
justly between the parties is but a small part of the task of an appellate
court when it decides a case. The actual dlispute involves a few people;
the law laid down by the court may vitally affect an untold number.
So it was in this case. The court held in favor of the heirs of the
adoptive parents. That the result was just is not here denied. Cer-
tainly the adoptive parents would not have contemplated that on the
death of themselves and the child their property should shift from their
family to the natural family of the child. But the court in arriving at
the result gave reasons which made bad law. In moving farther along
the same lines the law has since grown steadily worse.
The court voided the adoption and laid down the rule that the facts
necessary for the jurisdiction of the court in the adoption proceedings
must appear on the face of the record in those proceedings. Since no
service of process on the parents or voluntary appearance was found in
the adoption record, it failed to show a fact required by the statute,
namely that the natural parents be parties of record.
Further, the record failed to show consent by the mother. It was
argued that service on her and consent by her was unnecessary because
she had abandoned the child, but the facts recited on the record fell
short of so showing. Moreover, the abandonment which under the
statute results in forfeiture of right to the child's custody and care must
be wilful,50 which means, says the court, accomplished deliberately and
in violation of law. For this the court cites a case passing on the mean-
N. C. Pum. LAws 1933, c. 207. 11 N. C. PuB. LAws 1935, c. 243.
'p191 N. C. 430, 132 S. E. 295 (1926).




ing of the word "wilful" when used in a crininal statute.51 At any rate,
says the court, abandonment by the mother cannot be determined against'
her in a proceeding to which she was not a party. This is very well, but
the dissent brings out the additional fact that it is shown in the litigation
now before the court, to which the mother was a party, that at the time
of the adoption she had left her husband and children and was living
in adultery with another man.
It was contended that the adoptive father voluntarily entered into
the contract of adoption and recognized it all his remaining life, and
that after his death his heirs should not be permitted to assert his de-
parture from the statutory requirements when he made the adoption. The
court took the stand that here the errors rendered the adoption void,
that it was not binding even on the adoptive parents and hence not on
their heirs.
Oddly enough the court specifically approved the policy of providing
for the adoption of children, yet at the same time went far to frustrate
such policy.
The court may have been a prey to some uneasiness, for Justice
Connor, in a concurring opinion, seeks to allay fear by saying, "No
apprehension need be felt that this 'decision will hereafter be cited as
an authority to give this Court or the mothers of the State trouble."
52
Chief Justice Stacy, in his highly able dissenting opinion, looked to the
future with foreboding. Said he, "I think we are setting a precedent
which will rise up to trouble us in the future."53  His words were
prophetic, except as to the persons troubled. The precedent does not
seem to have troubled the court, indeed the court in subsequent cases
expands it to the point of destroying adoptions wholesale; but the
precedent and others expanding it have indeed risen up to trouble a
vast number of adopting parents and children.
The Truelove case illustrates how bad law may generate more bad
law. It was earlier established in this state that the natural and not
the adoptive family inherits from the child.5 4 Hence it was necessary
in the Truelove case to void the adoption in order to prevent the natural
family from succeeding to the property of the adoptive parents through
the child who briefly outlived them.
The legislature dissented from the Truelove decision. The following
gear it provided that any adoption proceeding to which the adopting
parent shall be a party shall be binding on him, regardless of lack of
jurisdiction as to other persons or irregularities in the proceeding. 55
"1 State v. Whitener, 93 N. C. 590 (1885).
52191 N. C. at 441, 132 S. E. at 300 (1926).
191 N. C. at 446, 132 S. E. at 303 (1926).
"Edwards v. Yearby, 168 N. C. 663, 85 S. E. 19 (1915).
"N. C. PuB. LAws 1927, c. 171. Some doubt as to the intent of the legisla-
1941]
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This statute if enforced would have the effect of preventing the adoptive
parents and hence their heirs claiming under them from questioning the
adoption.
The legislature also added to the abandonment section the provision
that upon a finding of abandonment by the court the abandoning parents
shall not be necessary parties to adoption proceedings.60
To complete the task of undoing the Truelove decision, the legis-
lature enacted that all adoption proceedings be validated and confirmed,5 7
and binding until vacated as provided by law.58 But the legislature
reckoned without the supreme court.
Ward v. Howard,59 decided in 1940, raised the question of the right
of an adopted child to inherit from her adoptive parents. Again the
court held the adoption void, this time for lack of consent of the natural
mother, the father being dead. The court in its discussion added to the
law of the Truelove case the requirement that the consent be to an
adoption by the particular adoptive parents.°0 The court escaped the
1927 act making the proceedings binding on the adoptive parents (hence,
here, on their heirs) first, by suggesting that the amendment be consid-
ered prospective (therefore, not applicable to this adoption which took
place in 1924) ; second, by indicating, none too clearly, that the legis-
lature could not make binding adoptions already had without consent of
the parents because it could not have dispensed with the requirement of
consent in the first place; third, by intimating that the legislature can-
not cure a previous lack of jurisdiction, and consent is jurisdictional.
All this is beside the point; the question was not whether the legislature
could fully validate adoptions without the requisite consent, it was
merely whether the legislature could make such proceedings binding on
the parties as to whom jurisdiction plainly did exist. By the same rea-
soning, here more applicable, the court escaped the 1927 curative act.
For good measure the court indicated that any law providing for adop-
tions without notice to a natural parent or proof of some such circum-
stance as abandonment might be unconstitutional.
The court spoke highly of adoption as a social institution, while
taking one more step toward frustrating its successful operation. The
positive terms of the law, said the court, cannot be made to yield to the
court's sentiment or desire.
0 1
Foregoing such sentiment, the court said that when adoption proceed-
ture may arise because the provisions was added to N. C. CoNsoL. STAT. (1919)
§185, whereas it more properly belonged in §184.
SN. C. Pun. LAWS 1927, c. 171. 'Ibid.
Evidently referring to N. C. CoNsoL. STAT. (1919) §188.
S'217 N. C. 201, 7 S. E. (2d) 625.
40 217 N. C. at 206-7, 7 S. E. (2d) at 628 (1940).0-217 N. C. at 208, 7 S. E. (2d) at 629 (1940).
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ings involve the descent and distribution of property they must be viewed
strictly.
62
Then came the case of In re Holder.63 Here a North Carolina child
was adopted in this state by residents of South Carolina, was taken to
that state and there resided until, eleven years later, her adoptive father
died. His brother, an heir, brought this action to have the adoption
declared void. Reversing the lower court, the supreme court held for
the brother.
Included in the reasons for this result was again the fact that neither
parent 64 was made a party in the adoption nor gave proper consent.
The natural mother was unmarried. She applied for admission of her
child to the home provided by the Children's Home Society of North
Carolina, and signed a paper agreeing that the Society might obtain a
legal adoption of the child by such persons as it might choose without
further notice to her. The Society consented to this adoption. This
consent the court ruled out on the ground that under the statute consent
by the parent must be with reference to the particular adoption by the
particular adoptive parents, not a general consent.6 5
In spite of the fact that the mother executed a document surrender-
ing the child to the Society for adoption, and, so far as appears, thence-
forth and for almost three years before the adoption and eleven years
thereafter left the child in the care and custody of others, the court says
there is nothing in the record to indicate an abandonment in the statutory
sense.
The adoption proceeding, says the court, is in derogation of the com-
mon law and must be strictly construed.66
CRITICISM IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN DECISIONS
The Choice of Policy
In Ward v. Howard67 the court ascribes its strict view of adoption
proceedings to the fact that they are "in derogation of succession by
heritable blood",68 and also says "Since early days, the attitude of the
North Carolina Court toward the law of real estate, descent and inher-
82217 N. C. at 205, 7 S. E. (2d) at 627 (1940).
8 218 N. C. 136, 10 S. E. (2d) 620 (1940).
,Here lies an implication that the father's consent was also necessary, al-
though the child was illegitimate. This must have been inadvertence. The court
would scarcely have introduced so great an innovation into the law so casually.
"Then as now the applicable statute may be searched in vain for any such
specific provision. It merely requires parental consent. N. C. CoNSOL. STAT.
(1919) §184, N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §191(5).
6218 N. C. at 141, 10 S. E. (2d) at 622 (1940).67217 N. C. at 205, 7 S. E. (2d) at 627 (1940).
"S In Minetree v. Minetree, 181 Ark 111, 26 S. W. (2d) 101 (1930) the court
took a similar view, but did so in order to prevent an adopted son from defeating,
at the expense of his adoptive mother, the will of his adoptive father. Here also
bad law seems to* have been laid down to reach a good result.
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itance, and distribution, has been classic. The result has been an exact-
ness and a certainty with respect to this subject that gave to the decisions
of the Court a very extended reputation." 69  The court may not be
wholly aware of the nature of the reputation. Pursuant to resolution of
the General Assembly of 1935, a commission of lawyers and legal schol-
ars was appointed by the governor to revise the North Carolina law
relating to estates. The commission reports that investigation ".... con-
vinced the Commission that the present laws of North Carolina relating
to the descent and distribution of the property of an intestate and to
the administration of decendents' estates . . . were outmoded . . . and
did not permit of the devolution of a decedent's property and the settle-
ment of his estate in a manner consonant with changed social and eco-
nomic conditions. North Carolina, always a conservative state so far
as changes in the law of real property are concerned, still clings with
stubborn tenacity to some of the antiques in its property law which it
inherited from England as a part of the common law of that country.
'70
In choosing to preserve the policy of the present laws of succession
by heritable blood at the expense of the policy of furthering adoptions,
it is earnestly submitted that the court preserved bad policy and rejected
good.
The court in In re Holder stated that adoptions must be strictly con-
strued because in derogation of the common law.71 In cases where a
natural parent is directly contesting an adoption, other courts have taken
the same view.72 In contrast with this view it has been emphatically
declared that adoption statutes are beneficial, embody sound policy, and
are to be construed fairly and reasonably to the end that adoptions be
upheld.73 Some courts have expressly repudiated the earlier doctrine
that adoption statutes are in derogation of the common 4aw and there-
fore must be construed strictly.74 Especially is a liberal construction
adhered to when the contesting parties are iollateral heirs of the adoptive
parents, strangers to the adoption proceedings, whose only interest is to
acquire the propertyof the adoptive parents by defeating the relation
the adoptive parents established and never themselves questioned.75 The
89217 N. C. at 205, 7 S. E. (2d) at 627 (1940).
o REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF THE REVISION OF THE LAWS OF NORTH CAR-
LINA RELATING TO ESTATES (1939) 5, 6.
' See note 66, supra.
"In re Newman, 88 Cal. App. 186, 262 Pac. 1112 (1927), followed in it re
Christie, 98 Cal. App. 158, 276 Pac. 1045 (1929) ; in re Jackson, 55 Nev. 174, 28
P. (2d) 125 (1934).
' McConnelf v. McConnell, 345 Ill. 70, 177 N. E. 692 (1931).
"'McConnell v. McConnell, 345 Ill. 70, 177 N. E. 692 (1931); Shaw v. Scott,
217 Iowa 1259, 252 N. W. 237 (1934).
7'Shaw v. Scott, 217 Ibwa 1259, 252 N. W. 237 (1934); Chamberlain v,
Thorne, 145 Kan. 663, 66 P. (2d) 571 (1937) ; In re 'Howard's Estate, 125 Okla.




Missouri court in such a case stated that the statute would be construed
in the light most favorable to the child, and expressly distinguished the
case from one where the natural parent sought custody.70
It has been shown earlier in this article that adoption statutes exist
today in every American jurisdiction, as well as in England whence
came the common law. What substance remains in the view that these
statutes are in derogation of the common law, and for that reason to be
strictly construed? The common law policy against adoptions is com-
pletely gone; there is no longer anything left of it to preserve by a strict
construction of the innovation. The new policy has become universal;
the adoption statutes cannot be in derogation of any other policy, for at
present there is no other, except a dead one.
Collateral Attack by Heirs
Pursuant to the liberal policy herein advocated, an imposing number
of recent decisions stand in opposition'to those of the North Carolina
court and allow an adopted child to inherit notwithstanding defects,
jurisdictional or otherwise, in the adoption proceedings shown by heirs
of the adoptive parents. This is done on one or more of several grounds.
One is estoppel. The usual reasoning is that the adoptive parents, who
failed to comply with the statute, would have been estopped to question
the adoption by reason of their own error; the heirs claim under the
adoptive parents, and are in no better position.77 The fact that for a
long time the adoptive parents accepted the fruits of the parent-child
relationship plays a part in this view. 78 Some courts, where the adoptive
parents long recognized the relationship and received its benefits, hold
the heirs estopped from questioning the relationship even when there
was no formal legal adoption proceeding at all.79
Estoppel then, is a legal doctrine used as a means for permitting a
child to inherit where the substance of an adoption exists although there
has been a mistake in procedure. But trouble is likely to arise where
some fixed legal doctrine, formulated for many other purposes, is chosen
in order to work a just result in the handling of new substance. The
courts may be decoyed into paying more attention to the nature of the
doctrine than the nature of the substance. This is illustrated by an Iowa
case80 where an adoptive father died, then his father (the adoptive grand-
" Drake v. Drake, 328 Mo. 966, 43 S. W. (2d) 556 (1931).
77 Harper v. Lindsey, 162 Ga. 44, 132 S. E. 639 (1926) ; Hunter v. Bradshaw,
209 Ind. 71, 198 N. E. 73 (1935); James v. Williams, 169 Tenn. 41, 82 S. W.
(2d) 541 (1935).
Shaw v. Scott, 217 Iowa 1259, 252 N. W. 23Z (1934) (containing a particu-
larly strong discussion favoring estoppel, supported by citations to many cases);
Cribbs v. Floyd, 188 S. C. 443, 199 S. E. 677 (1938).
"' Bergman v. Carson, 226 Iowa 449, 284 N. W. 442 (1939) ; Taylor v. Coberly,
327 Mo. 940, 38 S. W. (2d) 1055 (1931).
'0 Sheaffer v. Sheaffer, 292 N. W. 789 (Iowa 1940).
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father) 'died. The controversy is between the adopted child and the
other heirs of the adoptive father over the property of the grandfather.
Estoppel was urged on behalf of the adopted child. But the court said
that under the Iowa law the heirs took, not through the father, but
directly from the grandfather, therefore they are not in privity with the
adoptive father, and therefore do not fall under the estoppel which would
prevent his questioning the adoption. This is learned nonsense. Grant-
ing that a duly adopted child could take from the grandfather, the argu-
ment in favor of a child adopted in substance although not in perfect
form is as strong on the merits here as in other cases.
It must be conceded that some decisions, like those of our court,
take the view that there is no estoppel against the heirs to assert the
voidness of a void proceeding.81 The unwholesome results of such a
view may be found in a Wisconsin decision where even the adoptive
father was permitted to profit after the death of the adoptive mother
by bringing forward irregularities in the adoption he himself participated
in making.8 2 But in striking contrast to the North Carolina position is
a decision by the South Carolina court in a case involving a North Car-
olina adoption. 83 It was a case in which the sisters andbrothers of a
deceased adoptive father were attempting to obtain his property at the
expense of an adopted child by asserting various procedural shortcom-
ings in the North Carolina adoption. The court upheld the position of
the adopted child, in part on the basis of estoppel. The court thought
it would not be just to permit the child to discharge its duties as such
for seventeen years and then allow the brothers and sisters of the adop-
tive father to take from the child all rights as heir.
Another basis on which the adopted child is protected against heirs
of the adoptive parents is on the theory of a contract to adopt enforce-
able in equity to the extent of allowing the adopted child to inherit as
such. 4 The contract device is sometimes used where there were defects
in an adoption, 5 sometimes where'there was no formal adoption at
all." Where the substance of an adoption exists by reason of the taking
of a child as an adopted child and an ensuing lifelong relationship as
parent and child, some courts find a contract to adopt without any direct
"' Ashlock v. Ashlock, 360 IL..115, 195 N. E. 657 (1935) ; see Carter v. Cap-
shaw, 24Yt Ky. 483, 489, 60 S. W. (2d) 959, 962 (1933)." In re Mathews' Will, 198 Wis. 128, 223 N. W. 434 (1929).
" Cribbs v. Floyd, 188 S. C. 443, 199 S. E" 677 (1938).8 Note (1934) 2 Dum B. A. J. 17. See notes 85-87, infra.
" Ahern v. Matthews, 337 Mo. 362, 85 S. W. (2d) 377 (1935).8 Chamblee v. Wayman, 167 Ga. 821, 146 S. E. 851 (1929) ; Butler v. Ross,
188 Ga. 329, 4 S. E. (2d) 21 (1939) ; In re Firle's Estate, 197 Minn. 1, 265 N. W.
818 (1936); Taylor v. Coberly, 327 Mo. 940, 38 S. W. (2d) 1055 (1931); Drake
v. Drake, 328 Mo. 966, 43 S. W. (2d) 556 (1931); cf.- Chambers v. Byers, 214
N. C. 373, 199 S. E. 398 (1938).
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evidence of the making of such a contract.8 7 Georgia adds to the contract
theory the concept of a virtual adoption. 88 The contract theory was
rejected by one court89 on the ground that the adoptive parents being
dead, the contract to adopt was no longer susceptible of enforcement
because the dead parents could not then be shown to have the means
and disposition to care for the child in the future. This sounds plau-
sible, but does not bear analysis. The contract of adoption calls for
no more than a lifetime relationship and an heirship. When the lifetime
relationship has drawn to a close, if the heirship is enforced the contract
is completely performed. To say that it is no longer enforceable on
the death of the adoptive parents ignores its original nature.
Just as the use of the estoppel doctrine carries with it the danger
that courts may make the outcome depend on the characteristics of the
doctrine instead of the substance of the case so the use of the contract
theory lured the Georgia court" off into an examination of the question
whether the requirements for a contract were present, instead of an
examination of the substance behind the theory as applied to the adQp-
tion cases. The court found no evidence of any contract with anyone
competent to contract for the child. But as is too often true in this field,
the court appeared to be laying down bad law in order to reach" a good
decision between the parties to the case in hand. Here the next friend
of the child was suing the adoptive mother evidently in order to obtain
the property of the adoptive father. This may have looked to the court
like an undue hardship on the adoptive mother. But the law laid down
by the court would be equally applicable to a child who had worthily
lived and conducted himself as such, in litigation against collateral heirs.
Whether informal adoptions without any attempt to comply with adoption
statutes should be sanctioned is debatable, 91 but the debate should not
center on whether the forms of contract are present or absent.
Probably the best basis for permitting a child to inherit notwith-
standing defects in the adoption procedure is simply to look to the mer-
its9 2 and establish a rule to that effect, without casting the rule in terms
of any fixed doctrine such as estoppel or contract.
" Drake v. Drake, 328 Mo. 966, 43 S. W. (2d) 556 (1931) ; Ahern v. Mat-
hews, 337 Mo. 362, 85 S. W. (2d) 377 (1935). In Bergman v. Carson, 226 Iowa
449, 284 N. W. 442 (1939), the court held direct evidence of an adoption contract
unnecessary where the adult parties to it were dead.88 Chamblee v. Wayman, 167 Ga. 821, 146 S. E. 851 (1929) ; Elrod v. Sutton,
174 Ga. 900, 164 S. E. 682 (1932) ; Butler v. Ross, 188 Ga. 329, 4 S. E. (2d) 21
(1939).
09 St. Vincent's Infant Asylum v. Central Wis. Trust Co., 189 Wis. 483, 206
N. W. 921 (1926).
90 Rucker v. Moore, 186 Ga. 747, 199 S. E. 106 (1938).
'1 It may be argued that such adoptions are as undesirable as common law
marriages. But asserted common law marriages may grow out of illicit relations;
there is no temptation to enter illicitly into a parent-child relationship.
" Cf. Chamberlirr v. Thorne, 145 Kan. 663, 671, 66 P. (2d) 571, 576 (1937).
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Where, as in the North Carolina cases, the defect in the adoption
procedure lies in failure to take some statutory step for protecting the
rights of a party to the proceedings, such as failure to obtain consent of,
or give notice to, a natural parent, many courts take the common sense
view that only the parties injured are in a position to complain.93 It
is difficult to see why any court permits collateral heirs to come in and
complain successfully that an adoption was had without, let us say, notice
to a natural parent. Certainly the collateral heirs of the adoptive parent
were not hurt. They were not entitled to have anyone notified. Par-
ticularly puzzling is the North Carolina court's intimation in the Ward
case that a law providing for adoptions without notice to the natural
parents would be contrary to due process. Does due process to the heirs
of the adoptive parent require notice to the natural parent? Perhaps
the court confused the situation with cases where the natural parent is
contesting an adoption.94
Those who defend the rule that failure to comply with all the
statutory requirements in an adoption proceeding exposes the adoption
to collateral attack by heirs may argue that such law may easily be
escaped by adoptive parents by making wills. But when the best which
can be said of a rule is that it may be .avoided, the time has come to
change the rule. Further, the knowledge that their adoptions are void
and that they can leave their property to their adopted children only by
will, a procedure possible even in the case of strangers, is not welcome
knowledge to the adoptive parents of North Carolina. Certainly adop-
tive parents should make wills, especially in view of the present state
of the law, but the fact must be reckoned with that many people neglect
this precaution.
Presumption of Jurisdiction
If the heirs of the adoptive parents are, as in North Carolina, per-
mitted to attack the adoption for procedural defects, then some courts,
in common with ours, aid their assault by laying down a rule that all
facts necessary to the jurisdiction of the court must appear on the face
of the record in the adoption proceedings. The reasoning is that adop-
tion is a special or statutory proceeding the basis for which must appear
on the record.95 How such a requirement traps adopters is illustrated
9 'Hunter v. Bradshaw, 209 Ind. 71, 198 N. E. 73 (1935) ; Slattery v. Hartford-
Connecticut Trust Co., 254 Mich. 671, 236 N. W. 900 (1931); In re Howard's
Estate, 125 Okla. 86, 256 Pac. 54 (1926); 4 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS
(1936) 344. A statute to the same effect was applied in In re Hoermann's Estate,108 Mont. 386, 91 P. (2d) 394 (1939). In a guardianship proceeding the North
Carolina court took the view that failure to give required notice to an aunt having
custody of the child did not make the appointment void, hut that the aunt was
not hound by it. In re Samuel Parker, 144 N. C. 170, 56 S. E. 878 (1907).
, In. re Whetstone, 188 So. 576 (Fla. 1939).9, Hook v. Wright, 329 Ill. 299, 160 N. E. 579 (1928); Ashlock v. Ashlock,
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by an Arkansas case where the adoption order recited that the natural
father was a resident of the county, but failed to specify that the father
or the child was a resident of the particular district in the county. The
failure to recite this fact voided the adoption.98 The dissent points out
that a lawyer here drew the adoption order with the statute before him
and still failed to show all jurisdictional facts.97 But the modem tendency
is away from the rule that all jurisdictional facts must appear on the
adoption record, and in favor of the rule that the adoption will be upheld
unless want of jurisdiction is affirmatively shown. The decree of adop-
tion has the benefit of the presumption of jurisdiction which attaches to
judgments of courts of general jurisdiction.98  The Montana court held
that jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the record,9 9 but
in a well considered later opinion'0 0 expressly repudiated that holding,
and admitted that it had little, if any, support in reason and was contrary
to the tendency of recent cases. The court approved the view that courts
of general jurisdiction are accorded a presumption of jurisdiction by
virtue of the nature of the court, and that this reason holds as well in
special proceedings as general ones.
Consent to the Particular Adoption
Of all the rules above rehearsed, laid down by the supreme court
of this state, probably the most destructive is the one which adds to the
statutory provision for consent by the natural parent the requirement
that the consent be to the particular adoption by the particular adoptive
parents. How many adoptions this requirement destroyed in addition
to those before the court may never be known. In view of the fact that
the statute makes no such provision, and the court did not lay down the
rule until 1940, indeed prior thereto had held the opposite,1 0' a hollow
sound appears in the court's declaration that in adoptions, "The neces-
sary steps are easy to understand and easy to observe. ..,,02 Under
360 I1. 115, 195 N. E. 657 (1935). Accord: Norris v. Dunn, 184 Ark. 511, 43
S. W. (2d) 77 (1931).
In the case of adoptions under the 1935 act, if the petitions and orders are in
the form to be prescribed by the state board of charities and public welfare, N. C.
CODE ANx. (Michie, 1939) §§191(1), 191(6), it is possible the court may give
weight to this fact, and not overturn the adoptions for shortcomings in the recitals.
98 Minetree v. Minetree, 181 Ark. 111, 26 S. W. (2d) 101 (1930).
'" Minetree v. Minetree, 181 Ark. 111, 119, 26 S. W. (2d) 101, 105 (1930). But
here again the majority adhered to bad law for a good purpose. The adopted son
was trying to defeat the adoptive father's will leaving his property to his wife.
"Chamberlin v. Thorne, 145 Kan. 663, 66 P. (2d) 571 (1937); Slattery v.
Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co., 254 Mich. 671, 236 N. W. 902 (1931); James
v. Williams, 169 Tenn. 41, 82 S. W. (2d) 541 (1935); note (1926) 5 N. C. L.
REv. 67; cf. In re Howard's Estate, 125 Okla. 86, 256 Pac. 54 (1926); In re
Martin's Estate, 169 Okla. 55, 35 P. (2d) 968 (1934).
" State v. District Court, 75 Mont. 147, 242 Pac. 959 (1926).'"In re Hoermann's Estate, 108 Mont. 386, 91 P. (2d) 394 (1939).
'0' In re Foster, 209 N. C. 489, 183 S. E. 744 (1936), discussed hereinafter.
102 In re Holder, 218 N. C. 136, 142, 10 S. E. (2d) 620, 623 (1940).
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such view the practice of surrendering children to institutions with a con-
sent at the time of the surrender to adoptions to be arranged by the insti-
tution, results in void adoptions, because a general consent to adoption is
not enough; the consent must be to the particular adoption. This rule not
only invalidates adoptions wholesale, it thwarts for the future one of
the most beneficent purposes of adoption, namely to give the adopted
child a fresh start in life, entirely severed from the unhappy circum-
stances which made him a subject for adoption.10 3 It is to be remem-
bered that, as already shown herein, a large proportion of children
adopted were born illegitimate. In the community whence they come
they are under a grievous and undeserved handicap; under the court's
decisions the link between that darkened origin and the new life as an
adlopted child must remain, because the natural parent must know who
adopts the child in order to give consent. Unless this law is corrected
speedily, the result may well be to drive adoptive parents acquainted
with the law to make their adoptions outside the state, thus visiting
another penalty on unfortunate North Carolina children by diminishing
their prospect of being adopted.
The court justifies its rule by stating, "... society looks first to the
concern and foresight of the natural parents in the selection for the child
[of) adoptive parents. ..-. 14 This argument is appealing, but it is
out of touch with what is going on in the field of adoption. A large
fraction of adopted children are illegitimate; some of the remainder
come from homes made unfi by drunkenness, low morals, and the like.
Where is the substance in the view that the mother of an illegitimate, or
an otherwise unfit parent, willing to turn the child over to an institution
and be done with it (the problem of the validity of a general consent
given to an institution would not arise unless this were so) is a person
whose concern for the child and whose foresight are so necessary in
picking the adoptive parents that society cannot dispense therewith ?
To be specific, in the latest case wherein the court applied the rule10 5
under discussion the mother was unmarried, and she gave up the child
for adoption by persons selected by the Society. This mother's concern
for the child did not move her to refrain from bringing the child into
the world under a great handicap, nor from turning it over to strangers.
Is it really true that society looks to the foresight of such parents in
..3 That the legislature in passing the 1935 act had in mind the severance of
the child from his old connections is shown by the provision that it shall not be
necessary in the petition or other papers to give the true name of the child. N. C.
CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §191(2). The investigation report is excepted but
this in turn is not to be disclosed to anyone except on order of the court. Id.
§191(5). See also §§191(7), 191(9).
.0. Ward v. Howard, 217 N. C. 201, 207, 7 S. E. (2d) 625, 628 (1940) ; In rc
Holder, 218 N. C. 136, 141, 10 S. E. (2d) 620, 622 (1940)."'In re Holder, 218 N. C. 136, 10 S. E. (2d) 620 (1940).
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picking the adoptive parents? Apparently society, so far as it is repre-
sented by the legislature of North Carolina, was not willing to lean very
heavily on such concern and foresight, for investigation by skilled
agencies is required by statute.1' 6
The 1935 adoption statute dispenses with the requirement that the
natural parents be parties to the adoption proceedings when they have
signed a release of all rights t6 the child ;1o07 it should be amended to




The North Carolina court conceded, as above shown, that notice to
and consent of the natural parents is unnecessary where the parent has
abandoned the child. The statutes of many states dispense with the
consent of the abandoning parents. 0 9 The North Carolina statute does
so impliedly, and expressly dispenses with them as necessary partiesP"0
But our court pointed out that the abandonment by the terms of our
statute must be wilful, and then said, citing a criminal case, that wilful
meant accomplished deliberately, and in violation of law. Thereafter
the court, as already indicated, found no abandonment in 'the statutory
sense even where the natural mother in writing surrendered the child to
an institution for adoption, and thenceforth for years left it in the care
and custody of others.
This result illustrates the danger of arriving at the definition of a
word for the purposes of one statute, and then adhering to the same
definition when the same word appears in another type of statute,
What a "wilful" abandonment is for the purpose of dispensing with
consent in an adoption proceeding should not depend on the meaning of
"wilful" in criminal statutes. Instead light should be sought on the
question that wilful abandonment means for the purpose in hand."' It
... See note 42, supra.
1 1N. C. CODE ANx. (Michie, 1939) §191(4).
108 Cf. Cook, Suggestions as to Certain Changes in the Adoption Statutes (1938)
9 Mo. B. J. 47. The author -points out that practically all child placing institu-
tions in the city and county of St. Louis require the parent or parents to sign
an instrument authorizing the institution taking the child to consent on their behalf
to any decree of adoption, and also consenting to such adoption themselves. In
hundreds of cases the institutions in the city and county have consented to adop-
tions. The author recommends legislation legalizing the procedure where the
institution has custody under authority of the juvenile court. Most couples who
adopt children obtain them, he states, from incorporated institutions.
The Massachusetts court indicated approval of consent by an institution to
which a mother had surrendered a child for adoption. 'Hurley v. St. Martin, 283
Mass. 415, 186 N. E. 596 (1933) ; note (1935) 15 B. U. L. REv. 171, 177.
10 4 VERmER, AMERIcAN FAMILy LAWS (1936) 341. Even where there is no
abandonment, apparently North Carolina alone requires that the natural parents
be parties of record. Id. at 395. Notice to the parent is usually an incident of
obtaining consent. Id. at 343.
11 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §191(10).
111In examining decisions from other states no distinction will be made be-
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is submitted that "wilful" here should mean deliberate and unexcused,
nothing more. It has been held that abandonment means neglect and
refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support,
withholding the parent's presence, his care, and his opportunity to dis-
play voluntary affection.112 It is also said to be neglect and refusal to
perform the obligations of care and support.118 Save for the miscon-
strued word "wilful", this seems to be 'the concept of abandonment en-
tertained in the North Carolina statute, which covers cases where the
parents "have wilfully abandoned the care, custody, nurture and main-
tenance of the child" to others.114 Pursuant to such a concept, an aban-
donment -dispensing with the necessity of consent to an adoption has
been found where the natural mother in Germany sent her son to a
sister in this country with a writing giving the son to the sister.115 The
same result was reached as to both natural parents where the natural
father decamped and for a time made no effort to provide for the child's
care, and the mother, through a newspaper advertisement, relinquished
the child to others.110 This case also holds in dccord with the point
made by the dissent in the Truelove case, namely that although aban-
donment cannot be found against a parent in an adoption to which he
is not a party, still the proceeding in which he attacks the adoption is
a proper one wherein to determine that he was guilty of abandonment
and therefore bound by the adoption without his consent.
Other courts have regarded abandonment as a settled purpose to
forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims. This defi-
nition lured the Georgia court into deciding that a natural father who
had for years specifically refused to fulfill his obligations to the child
still had not abandoned the child because he had not also intended to
forsake his rights."' So far as anything the father did is concerned
the child would have met a real and not a theoretical starvation; yet the
father was permitted to come in and defeat an adoption action on the
ground that his consent was still necessary because he had not aban-
doned the child. The case illustrates again the evils of decision by
definition, which causes courts to fix their attention on the definition
and not the substance. The above definition fits such cases as those
where the parent surrenders the child and thereafter leaves its care to
tween cases involving attack by heirs of deceased adoptive parents, and cases of
attack by natural parents seeking to recover their children. So far as appears
the question of abandonment is no different in the two types of case.
"'In re Dein's Will, 135 Misc. 244, 237 N. Y. Supp. 658 (Surr. Ct., 1929).
"'In re Davis' Adoption, 142 Misc. 681, 255 N. Y. Supp. 416 (Surr. Ct.,
(1932).IlN. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §191 (10).
"'In re Dein's Will, 135 Misc. 244, 237 N. Y. Supp. 658 (Surr. Ct., 1929).
eIn re Davis' Adoption, 142 Misc. 681, 255 N. Y. Supp. 416 (Surr. Ct., 1932).
1 Glendinning v. McComas, 188 Ga. 345, 3 S. E. (2d) 562 (1939).
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others ;U8 the same definition should not be employed where it does not
fit. It proved a snare in the Georgia case. 1 9
Courts have properly concluded that where parents abandon their
children, and during the period of the parents' dereliction new ties are
formed between the children and those who render the care which the
parents failed to give, the guilty parents should not be permitted to come
in and sever at will the new ties.120 This is sound public policy; it
recognizes that the ties of blood entail not alone rights but duties, and
that those who leave the duties to others are in a poor position to assert
the rights.
ATTACK By NATURAL PARENT
12
The North Carolina decisions in cases where adoptions are attacked
by heirs of the adoptive parents are at least consistent; when adoptions
are attacked by natural parents seeking a return of the children, the
decisions are hopelessly inconsistent. In 1920 was decided the case of
Brickell v. Hines.122 Here an adoption of an infant one month old took
place, and the unmarried mother joined in the petition. The natural
parents two years later brought habeas corpus to recover the child. So
far as appears the adoption was perfectly valid. Yet the regularly
adopted child was given back to the natural parents. The only indica-
tion in the report of the case on appeal of any reason for taking the
child from the adoptive parents lay in the bare statement that there was
evidence tending to show that the welfare of the child would be served
by awarding it to its parents. The supreme court reasoned that even
the right of natural parents to their children must yield when the wel-
fare of the child requires it, and the right of adoptive parents is no
greater.
The grounds for the result here are beyond criticism. They are
beyond criticism because we are not told what they were. The court,
sustained a lower court in taking a duly adopted child from adoptive
parents and awarding it to the natural parents after a lapse of years.
So far as the writer has discovered this is the first time the supreme
court ever did such a thing. Yet not one word in the opinion advised
"Itt re Cohen's Adoption, 155 Misc. 202, 279 N. Y. Supp. 427 (Surr. Ct.,
1935) ; Appeal of Weinbach, 316 Pa. 333, 175 Atl. 500 (1934). Proper application
of the idea that rights were not relinquished is made in Pitzenberger v. Schnack,
215 Iowa 466, 245 N. W. 713 (1932).
... The Nebraska court found from a long course of conduct foregoing all
duties evidence of a relinquishment of all claims. It re Carlson's Adoption, 137
Neb. 402, 289 N. W. 764 (1940).
...In re Carlson's Adoption, 137 Neb. 402, 289 N. W. 764 (1940); In re
Davis' Adoption, 142 Misc. 681, 255 N. Y. Supp. 416 (Surr. Ct., 1932); Appeal of
Weinbach, 316 Pa. 333, 175 Atl. 500 (1934). Accord: Wyness v. Crowley, 292
Mass. 461, 198 N. E. 758 (1935); Lane v. Pippen, 110 W. Va. 357, 158 S. E.
673 (1931).
1.. See also discussion of abandonment, above.
22 179 N. C. 254, 102 S. E. 309 (1920).
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adoptive parents of what circumstances would result in a forfeiture of
their children, save for the enigmatic declaration that the welfare of the
child in this case justified the forfeiture. What circumstances will sup-
port such a conclusion? No doubt hundreds of adoptive parents would
like to know.
It sounds plausible to say that custody may be taken from a natural
parent where the interest of the child requires it, and that an adoptive
parent -should be in no better position. But if a natural parent has at
all times kept custody of the child -and adequately cared for it, a court
would hardly take the child away and put it in the hands of some person
better able to look after it. Otherwise all the poor sinners in North
Carolina could be deprived of their children by rich saints, if such there
be in this state. The court should have made it plain that the adoptive
parents were being deprived of their child by reason of some grievous
default in their duties; and if there was no such default the court should
not have taken away the child.
12
Somewhat less objectionable is the case of In re Shelton. 124 The
mother of an illegitimate left it with the adoptive parents almost from
birth; for the first two years it was sick much of the time, and had the
best of care. The child was adopted, and the mother consented, but she
was not made a party because she did not want her identity known.
When the child was three years old the mother sought to recover it.
The lower court found the adoption void because the mother was not a
party, but that the best interests of the child would be served by leaving
it with the adoptive parents. The supreme court reversed the lower
court and gave the child to the natural mother on the ground that the
mother is entitled to the child if the mother is a fit person, even though
there are others more fit. The case is not important on the question of
the invalidity of the adoption, for the lower court's holding on that point
was uncontested on appeal, but it is important on the question of the
consequences to the adoptive parents. They lose the child after bringing
it through the most trying period of its life.
Completely inconsistent with these cases, as well as the Ward and
Holder cases hitherto discussed, is In re Foster.125 The mother of an
illegitimate delivered it to a member of the Junior League of Charlotte,
and at the same time signed a paper releasing it to the county superin-
tendent of public welfare and consenting to adoption of the child by
persons approved by him. This was in 1932. An adoption petition was
filed in 1933 under the 1933 adoption act without notice to the mother.
Before the adoption became final, the natural mother and her husband,
12 Urrutia v. Urrutia, 142 S. W. (2d) 267 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) (applying
a statute) ; BROOKS AND BROOKS, ADVENTURING IN ADopTIoN (1939) 46.
12 203 N. C. 75, 164 S. E. 332 (1932).
1.5 209 N. C. 489, 183 S. E. 744 (1936).
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she having married, filed a petitibn in the adoption proceeding asking
the court to award them the child and dismiss the proceeding. The lower
court found both the adoptive parents and the natural mother and her
husband to be suitable persons, but found that the child's future could
best be promoted in the home of the adoptive parents, and ordered that
letters of adoption be issued. This the supreme court affirmed, on the
ground that the mother had relinquished her right to care and custody,
that what she had done amounted to a waiver of her right to notice in
the adoption proceeding, and that the adoptive parents had acted in
reliance on her voluntary act. If the court relied on the 1933 act to
reach these results it did not say so. The doctrine of waiver and re-
linquishment were laid down without reference to statute. Thus here
the mother lost although she neither was made a party nor gave consent
to the specific adoption, and although she asserted her rights before the
adoption was complete, whereas in other cases such defects were held
fatal to adoptions long since completed and long acted upon. The writer
by no means intends to criticize this decision or the law laid down. The
result is supported by decisions in other states.1 26 But the case leaves
our law hopelessly confused. If, as the law now stands, an adoptive
parent sought the advice of counsel as to whether his child could be
taken from him, and if so, what could be done to avert such a future
disaster, completely candid advice would have to run like this: "Be
good, prosper if you can, treat the child well, love it, educate it, send
it to church. Then, if the natural parent turns over a new leaf, and goes
to court to get the child back, and if the lower court and the supreme
court on the days you are there look favorably on long continued love
and care, you will win. But if on those days they are feeling more
favorably inclined to the idea that blood is thicker than water, you will
lose. What effect the fact that you have -duly adopted the child will have
no one knows, but it will probably help some. If this does not sound
like law, do not blame me. The courts and the legislature make the
law; I am merely describing as best I can the law as I find it."
STATUS AND PROPERTY RIGHTS
Assuming a child to be validly adopted, the question frequently
arises as to his rights of inheritance, and rights of inheritance from him.
The North Carolina statute specifically gives him, if the adoption be
for life, the right to inherit from the adoptive parents.12 7 Under this
limited proyision our court has held that the natural, not the adoptive,
.2 Accord: Wyness v. Crowley, 292 Mass. 461, 198 N. E. 758 (1935); Appeal
of Weinbach, 316 Pa. 333, 175 Ad. 500 (1934). But cf. In re Cohen's Adoption,
155 Misc. 202, 279 N. Y. Supp. 427 (Surr. Ct, 1935).
""' N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §191(6). This has been true from the
beginning of adoption in this state. N. C. PuB. LAws 1872-1873, c. 155. §3.
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parents inherit from the child;128 that the child does not inherit from
the adoptive parents' kindred, 129 and that a child adopted after a will
does not take as a child born after a will.180  Our statute clearly needs
correction. Accepted social theory regards adoption as a complete sub-
stitution of the adoptive family for the natural in every respect except
the biological. 131 Accordingly the adopted child should take the same
place in the adoptive family which he would have if he were born there
at the time of the adoption, and his rights of inheritance arising from
his natural birth should be severed.'3 2 Such a provision would aid in
insuring that the ties between the child and his origin would never be
resurrected. The Commission on Revision of the Laws of North Caro-
lina Relating to Estates recommends a statute, in the case of adoption
for life, as follows: "Succession by, through, and from adopted children
and their adoptive parents shall be the same as if the adopted children
were the natural, legitimate children of the adoptive parents. Succession
by adopted children and their lineal descendants from or through their
natural parents or by or through the natural parents from adopted chil-
dren or their lineal descendants shall take place only where but for such
succession the State of North Carolina would succeed to the intestate's
property."' 83 The exception designed to prevent escheats may be de-
batable, since it might promote the resurrection of the old ties, but at
any rate only rare cases would come under it.
Further, for all purposes besides inheritance it should be made clear
by statute that the adopted child is to be regarded in law as if he had
been born the child of the adoptive parents. 8 4 In the case of In re
Holden's Trust135 the Minnesota court in an unusually lucid and well
reasoned opinion by Justice Peterson construed the statute of that state
'28 Edwards v. Yearby, 168 N. C. 663, 85 S. E. 19 (1915).
.. Grimes v. Grimes, 207 N. C. 778, 178 S. E. 573 (1935).
I" Sorrell v. Sorrell, 193 N. C. 439, 137 S. E. 306 (1927). The court pointed
out that under the statute the adopted child takes from the adoptive parent only
if the parent dies intestate.
131 
BROOKS AND BROOKS, ADVENTURINd IN ADOPTION (1939) 136.
2 Legis. (1936) 22 IowA L. REv. 145, 153, 154. The present statutory provisions
on this matter in the different jurisdictions vary widely. 4 VERNIER, AMERICN
FAMILY LAWS (1936) beginning at 410.
Shepherd v. Murphy, 322 Mo. 1176, 61 S. W. (2d) 746 (1933) illustrates the
value for North Carolina of such change. Under such lam, on a set of facts like
those in the case of Truelove v. Parker, 191 N. C. 430, 132 S. E. 295 (1926), the
court was able to hold that the property went to the heirs of the adoptive parents
without, as in the Truelove case, impeaching the adoption. That result was reached
notwithstanding an admittedly valid adoption.
1Is REPORT OF THE CoMMIsSION ON REVISION OF THE LAWS OF NORTH CAROLINA
RELATING TO ESTATES (1939) 30. See also 116.
t" This is already commonly true for most purposes. MADDEN, PERSONS AND
DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1931) 359. Cf. N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §191(6).
Under the Workmen's Compensation Act both "child" and "grandchild" are
defined to include adopted children. N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §8081 (i) (1).
.8. 207 Minn. 211, 291 N. W. 104 (1940). An adopted child was held to come
within the term "lawful issue" in a will.
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to give the adopted child the status of a child of the body of the adoptive
parent.
It may be objected that it is unfair to the other members of a family
to permit the adoptive parents to bring a stranger into the family. After
all, the grandparents, uncles, aunts, and others have not adopted the
child. At once the analogy to marriage is again visible. The relatives
have not married the wife either, but into the family she comes, and
well she may, or families shortly would cease to exist. Or it may be
urged that there are cases where the complete establishment of the child
in the same relationship as if he were born to the adoptive parents may
work to his harm. Thus a man adopted a child with considerable prop-
erty, and then poisoned him. The court, in a suit by the child's adminis-
trator for pain and suffering before death, was confronted with the rule
that a child cannot sue his parent in tort. In order to permit recovery
the court made the declaration that there was no natural tie of blood
and affection to be protected by denying a tort action by an adopted
child against the parent.136 But no impairing of the full parent-child
status would have been necessary to reach the desired result. In the
first place, in the case of voluntary torts of this character even a natural
child should be permitted to sue. The declaration that such suits may
destroy harmony in the home is unimpressive when the home life has
already been outraged by such a tort. Or, if a court did not choose to
overturn the rule against tort actions by children against their parents,
it could still hold that adoption created a full parent-child relation, but
that the tort destroyed the adoption relation retroactively as of the time
it was created.
RECOMMENDED REPAIRS
As appears from the above discussions repairs in the North Caro-
lina statute are needed. But more necessary than these is a reexamina-
tion by the North Carolina court of its strict attitude toward adoptions.
Statutes intended to be liberal may be rendered harsh by a strict and
unsympathetic construction. At one point or another, as already shown,
our court's strict view is out of line with the modern trend in other
jurisdictions, out of line with the best social views, out of line with the
views of an expert commission of lawyers and scholars appointed by
the governor at the instance of the legislature, out of line with liberal-
izing efforts by the legislature. The court of our sister state of South
Carolina regarded a North Carolina adoption more favorably than our
own court would have done. Certainly these facts call for a reexamina-
tion by the court of its view favoring strict construction of the adoption
statutes. If, on such reexamination in the light of all information at
... Brown v. Cole, 198 Ark. 417, 129 S. W. (2d) 245 (1939).
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hand, the court is still persuaded that strictness is called for and that its
present position is sound, then the court should adhere to that view in
spite of unwarranted criticism, for the court and not critics of its deci-
sions holds the ultimate responsibility for interpretation of the laws of
this state. Conversely, if the court on reexamination finds that strict
interpretation of adoption statutes on the theory that they are in deroga-
tion of the common law is an outworn approach, it should be discarded.
Based on the previous discussion the following suggestions for
changes in our statute are made. Only the substance of the changes,
not the form, is here suggested.
1. It should be provided thtat where the natural parents surrender
the child to a duly licensed child placing agency for adoption the con-
sent of the parents to a subsequent adoption shall not be necessary. 137
The provision should be made retroactive.
2. That no party to a completed adoption proceeding or anyone
claiming under him may later question the validity of the adoption.
138
The statute should be made retroactive, but if the. court adheres to its
view in the Ward case this statute would not be effective.
3. That no adoption may be questioned by reason of any procedural
defect by anyone not injured by such defect.
4. That an order of adoption shall have the force and effect of, and
shall be entitled to, all the presumptions attaching to a judgment ren-
tiered by a court of general jurisdiction in a common law action.1 30
5. That a parent shall be deemed to have abandoned the child for
the purposes of the adoption statute when the parent intentionally and
without good cause for the period of four months or more withholds
from the child the parents' presence, care, and maintenance. That aban-
donment may be proved in the adoption proceedings and that thereupon
the adoption may be ordered without notice to or consent of the aban-
doning parent. But the parent, within one year of actual notice of the
adoption may have it set aside on proof that he had not at the time of
the adoption, and has not since, abandoned the child, and that he failed
to appear in the adoption proceedings because he did not know of such
proceedings.
6. That defects in the adoption procedure shall not prevent inheri-
tance by a child who has after the adoption continuously lived as the
adopted child of the adoptive parents.
7. That a parent who has not consented to nor been made a party
to an adoption where such steps are required, may have the adoption
vacated provided he bring action to vacate within one year of actual
1 "N. Y. Dom. REL. LAW §111.
las Cf. N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §191(6).
1 N. Y. Dom. REL. LAW §110.
[Vol. 19
THWARTING ADOPTIONS
notice of the adoption, 40 and provided he faile to appear in the adop-
tion proceedings because he did not know of such proceedings.
8. That where the natural parents surrender the child for adoption,
and the child is taken by prospective adoptive parents in reliance thereon
and kept for the period of three months or more, the surrender of the
child shall not be revocable by the natural parents.
9. That when a child is duly adopted, the adoptive parents shall not
thereafter be deprived of any rights in the child, by the natural parents
or otherwise, except in the same fashion and for the same causes as
are applicable in proceedings to deprive natural parents of their children.
10. That a parent who has consented to an adoption need not be
made a party of record in the adoption proceedings. But in such case
the parent, within one year of actual notice of the adoption proceedings,
may have the adoption vacated onm proof that he gave no consent to the
adoption of the child, and that he did not appear in the adoption pro-
ceedings because he did not know of such proceedings.
11. The recommendations concerning adopted children proposed by
the Commission on Revision of the Laws of North Carolina Relating
to Estates should be enacted into law, with the additional provision that
an adopted child for all purposes be in the same legal position as he
would be if he had been born to his adoptive parents.141
With suitable improvements in our law perhaps adoptions of North
Carolina children will be encouraged to the point where it can no longer
be written, "Some of the extremes of foster care range from that in
North Carolina with 94 per cent of its -dependent children in institu-
tions, to Massachusetts with only 23 per cent institutionalized."'
42
1 44 VFaNsm, AmERICAN FAMILY LAWS (1936) 344. Cases applying com-
parable statutes are Hurley v. St. Martin, 283 Mass. 415, 186 N. E. 596 (1933);
Johnson v. Johnson, 124 Ore. 480, 264 Pac. 842 (1928).
1 See note 133, supra.
242 BROOKS AND BROOKS, ADVENTURING IN ADOPTION (1939) 113.
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